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Best available copyRIVAL  STOCK  PRICE  REACTIONS  TO 
LARGE  BHC  ACQUISITION  ANNOUNCEMENTS: 
EVIDENCE  OF  LINKED  OLIGOPOLY? 
I. Introduction 
In  recent years,  the number  of  intra-  and  interstate bank  holding company 
(BHC)  mergers  and  acquisitions has  increased dramatically.  For  the most  part, 
these have  been  market  extension mergers,  and  have  had  little  or no  impact  on 
local market  concentration.  Nevertheless,  many  observers  have  voiced concern 
over  the competitive  consequences  of this trend toward geographical 
diversification and  aggregate concentration.  This paper  examines  one  of the 
more  prominent of these  concerns -- linked oligopoly.  In  particular, it 
addresses  the question:  do multimarket contacts among  geographically 
diversified bank  holding companies  adversely affect competition?  This 
question is  particularly relevant to the banking industry today because  linked 
oligopoly is one  of the economic  arguments  frequently used  to justify existing 
barriers to  interstate banking. 
The  linked oligopoly hypothesis holds that increased multimarket contact 
among  geographically  diversified  bank  holding companies  may  lead to  a 
lessening of local market  competition.  According  to  the theory,  BHCs 
operating in several  different geographical markets  are  likely to shy  away 
from vigorous competition in  local markets out of fear that their rivals will 
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themselves  as  being more  vulnerable.  Competing  firms in  this environment, it 
is argued,  will develop  a more  benign,  "live and  let live" attitude toward one 
another.  This behavior -- also known  as  mutual  forbearance --  is  seen  as  an 
outgrowth of rival firms'  recognition of  a mutual  interdependence  across 
markets.'  In this way,  then,  the linked oligopoly hypothesis predicts that, 
as  large BHCs  come  to  meet  each  other  in progressively more  markets, 
competition  in local markets  wi  11  suffer. 
A  lessening of competition,  however,  is just one  of several  possible 
outcomes  of increased multimarket  contact.  Solomon  [121,  for example, 
suggested  that increased multimarket  contact among  BHCs  could also lead to an 
increase in  competition.  Thus,  in  examining  the competitive effects of 
multimarket  contact among  BHCs,  one  is  presented  with the possibility of two 
extreme  outcomes --  increased competition on  the one  hand  and  reduced 
competition resulting from linked oligopoly on  the other. 
It  was  not until the late 1970s  that researchers began  to  empirically 
investigate linked oligopoly and  the competitive  consequences  of increased 
multiple market  contact among  competing firms.  Relatively little  empirical 
work has  been  done  to  date.  Much  of it  has  focused on  geographical 
diversification in the banking industry.  Most  studies have  employed  the 
standard structure-performance  paradigm of industrial organization  to  test the 
competitive impact of increasing intermarket  linkages.  They  have  used  either 
accounting measures  of profits, expressions  of  market rivalry or some  other 
performance measure  as  dependent  variables and  various measures  of  multimarket 
contact as  independent  variables,  controlling for other factors likely to 
affect performance,  such  as  market concentration and  growth.  So  far, results 
have been  mixed:  some  of  the early research  suggested  an 
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supported  the existence of  a pro-competitive effect or of  no effect at 
all.'  In  view of the mixed  results and  the paucity of studies,  the 
empirical  literature has  not been  able  to  convincingly verify or dismiss  the 
linked oligopoly hypothesis. 
11.  THE  EVENT-STUDY  APPROACH 
In  this paper,  a somewhat  different approach  was  used  to  examine  the 
competitive effect of increasing multimarket  links among  large BHCs.  An 
event-study framework  similar to  that used  by  Eckbo  (3) was  utilized to 
generate market-based  estimates of the competitive  impact of  large,  intrastate 
BHC  acquisitions on rival holding company  stock returns.  The  nature of the 
relationship between  stock returns and  multimarket  links was  then examined. 
By  relying on market-based  stock price data rather than accounting measures, 
some  of the conceptual  and  practical difficulties associated with accounting 
measures  of  market performance  were  circumvented.  This approach presumes  that 
equity markets  are efficient,  that is,  that all available  information relating 
to  a given firm's profitability is  reflected relatively quickly in stock 
market returns.  Another  implicit assumption  is that geographically 
diversified BHCs  operate  subsidiary units as  part of  an  integrated entity. 
According  to  event-study literature, abnormal  stock returns around merger 
announcements  provide  information on  shareholders'  expectations of the 
proposed merger's  impact on  revenue and  cost conditions,  and  therefore 
profits,  of  both the acquiring firm  and  rival firms operating in the same 
industry.  Positive abnormal  returns indicate an  increase in  the expected 
spread between  revenues  and  costs,  while negative returns  indicate an  expected 
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event on  the future profitability  of  a given firm should be  reflected 
relatively quickly in  its stock returns. 
By  following the paradigm used  by  Eckbo  (3>,  abnormal  stock returns 
accruing to  rivals around  acquisition dates  can  be  examined  for information on 
whether  or not investors  expected  the mergers  to  generate collusive, 
anti-competitive effects.  If a merger  is pro-competitive,  providing the 
acquirer with a cost advantage,  rival BHCs'  future profits should  be  dampened 
and  rival abnormal  returns should be  negative.  If,  on  the other hand,  a given 
merger  will have  an  anti-competitive effect -- that is, it  creates  a collusive 
environment -- rival firms may  be  expected  to  earn  increased profits.  This, 
in  turn,  should be  reflected in  positive abnormal  returns accruing to  rivals 
around  the announcement  date.  This  provides  the necessary  condition for an 
anti-competitive linked oligopoly effect  -- positive abnormal  returns accruing 
to  rival BHCs  around merger   announcement^.^ 
In this paper,  abnormal  returns of  rival BHCs  around  large BHC  merger 
announcements  were  estimated and  cumulated  in  a narrow  interval  around  the 
announcement  date  in  order to  isolate the  impact of  the merger  announcement  on 
the expected profitability of  rival BHCs.  Cumulative  abnormal  returns of 
rival BHCs  were  then related to  changes  in intermarket  linkage measures 
similar to  those  used  by previous researchers.  If linked oligopoly in  fact 
exists,  and if increases  in  multimarket links between  BHCs  adversely affect 
competition,  merger  announcements  that would  increase  the number  of 
multimarket linkages between  dominant BHCs  should prompt  shareholders  to 
revise upward  their expectations of rival BHC  profitability.  This,  in turn, 
should be  reflected in  positive abnormal  stock returns accruing to rival 
BHCs.  Larger  increases  in  links,  moreover,  should be  associated with higher 
positive abnormal  returns. 
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111.  Sample  and  Methodology 
Sampl e 
The  sample  is  nonrandom.  The  states examined  were  those where  a 
relatively large number  of sizable BHC  acquisitions had  taken place in  recent 
years.  States  that had  recently changed  their intrastate or interstate 
branching law  in  any  material  way  were  excluded.  The  final sample  was  drawn 
from  six states:  Ohio,  Wisconsin,  New  Jersey,  Missouri,  Texas  and  Michigan. 
The  dominant rivals in  each  of these  states  were  defined to  be  at least the 
five  largest BHC's  headquartered  there (all with total assets  in  excess  of  $1 
billion).  Several  other large BHC's  were  included in  states where  they 
existed.  This process yielded a total of  39  rivals -- 8  in  Ohio,  5  in 
Wisconsin,  6  in  New  Jersey,  7  in  Missouri,  7  in  Texas  and  6  in  Michigan.  In 
each of these  states,  all rival acquisitions of  banking organizations  larger 
than $250  million in  total assets  that took place  since 1980  were  then 
identified.  This produced  a total of  55  acquisitions for analysis -- 8  in 
Ohio,  7  in  Wisconsin,  9 in  New  Jersey,  20  in Texas,  5  in  Missouri,  and  6  in 
Michigan.  The  Wall  Street Journal  and  American  Banker  Indexes  were  used  to 
identify the calendar dates on which  each  of the acquisitions was  announced. 
Thus,  announcement  dates,  rather than effective  dates,  were  used  as  event 
dates. 
Met  hod0  1  ogy 
The  relationship between  rival cumulative abnormal  returns (CARS) around 
acquisition dates,  and  multimarket  linkages  among  dominant  firms,  was 
investigated in two alternate ways.  First, following  the procedure  employed 
by Eckbo  (3>, the rival BHC's  for each  acquisition were  pooled into equally 
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for the rival portfolios and  aggregate  linkage measures  was  explored.  The 
aggregate  linkage measures  take only linkages between  the top three  BHC's  in 
the  state into account and  so  change  only when  one  of these  firms is involved 
in  a merger.  If large BHC  intrastate acquisitions  facilitate collusion,  the 
bulk of these CAR  measures  should be  positive,  as  should the cross-sectional 
average  of these measures  (CAAR).  Further, if the linked oligopoly theory  is 
correct,  the positive CAR  measures  should be  larger for acquisitions that 
increase  the  linkages  between  the dominant  firms,  or aggregate  links,  than for 
acquisitions which  leave these  linkages unchanged. 
However,  looking only at the relationship between  returns  to  portfolios of 
rivals and  aggregate  links may  not be  the best way  to investigate the  linked 
oligopoly hypothesis.  These  acquisitions differ in  a number  of respects -- 
the  size of the acquired institution,  the year it  took place,  the state in 
which it  occurred,  the impact on  the existing linkage pattern,  the existing 
link pattern,  etc.  Thus,  it  might not be  informative or appropriate  to 
examine  these acquisitions together as  a group.  More  importantly, if  one 
examines  only portfolio returns, it  is not possible  to  gain insight into the 
distribution of  stock price responses  across rivals.  This makes  it  difficult 
to  determine  whether  the responses  observed are related to linkage changes  or 
if they are due  to  other factors  (such  as  takeover  speculation). 
In  any  investigation of the linked oligopoly hypothesis,  specification of 
the linkage variables is crucial.  Theory  does  not provide a great deal  of 
insight on  how  this should be  done.  Obviously,  the impact of  any  acquisition 
on  the 1  inkage  structure in  any  state depends  on  the identity of the acquiring 
firm,  on  the characteristics of the acquired institution, and  on  how  one 
chooses  to  measure  linkages.  It is possible that large firms other  than  the 
top two or 
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due  to  mergers  involving these firms could impact  competition.  Therefore,  the 
relationship between  the abnormal  stock price response  of  each  rival and  its 
linkages  with the acquiring institution before and  after acquisition was  also 
investigated. 
If the mutual  forbearance hypothesis  is correct,  rivai abnormal  stock 
returns  should be  positively related to  changes  in the number  of such  links. 
However,  the competitive  impact of a given increase  in links realistically 
should depend on  the level of linkages  prevailing prior to  the acquisition 
announcement  as  well.  A  critical or threshold  level of linkages might exist; 
increases  in  linkages might result in  recognition of mutual  interdependence 
only when  links increase above  this level.  Thus,  the relationship between 
each  rival's abnormal  returns,  a linkage change  variable,  and  an  interaction 
variable -- the product of  the change  and  the pre-acquisition linkage level -- 
was  also investigated.  The  mutual  forbearance  hypothesis  suggests  that both 
the linkage change  variable and  the interaction tern1  should be  positively 
related to  rival CAR'S,  cet.  par. 
A  key presumption in  both approaches  is that the rival stock price 
reactions are not attributable to  increases  in  concentration within markets 
and  the creation of horizontal market  power.  There  were  several  reasons  for 
this view.  First,  the sample  was  restricted to  BHC  merger  announcements, 
which must  be  approved by  the Federal  Reserve.  As a result, merger  proposals 
that would  substantially increase  local market  concentration should be 
screened out.  In  fact,  this proved  correct.  Very  few of the events  in the 
sample  resulted in  any material  increase  in local market concentration.  Of 
the 55  mergers  in  the sample,  there were  only eight in which  the three-firm 
concentration ratio (CR3)  increased by five or  more  percentage  points in  any 
one 
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county.  In  addition,  the impact of  changes  in local market concentration on 
rival stock price reactions was  investigated empirically.  No  discernible 
effect  was  evident. 
Calculation of Abnormal  Returns 
After the merger  announcement  dates  were  identified,  daily stock price 
data for each  rival and  also for the Standard  and  Poor's  500  and  OTC  bank 
stock  indexes  were  obtained from the DRI  stock price database.  These  data 
were  used  to  construct continuously compounded  daily return series,  which  in 
turn were  used  to  generate  the abnormal  returns for each  rival and  equally 
weighted portfolio of rivals around  each  acquisition date. 
The  specific procedure  was  as  follows.  A two-factor market model  was 
estimated for each  rival and  portfolio of  rivals for  each  acquisition date 
using OLS."  The  two-factor version was  employed  to  control  for any  industry 
effect  impacting bank  returns over this interval.  It  had  the following 
general  form: 
where  R,,,  =  continuously compounded  daily stock 
return for the ith  rival or ith 
portfolio of  rivals 
RMt  =  the continuously  compounded  daily 
return on  the S&P500  index 
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e,,t =  a random  error term with standard 
properties 
A,,  BlVi  and  B,,,  are regression 
coefficients  to  be  estimated 
This model  was  estimated using returns beginning one  year  before and  ending 
120  days  prior to  the acquisition announcement  date.  Predicted returns 
generated using this equation and  actual  index returns on days  surrounding  the 
acquisition announcement  or event date are defined to  be  normal  returns for 
each  rival or the portfolio of  rivals.  The  difference between  the predicted 
return on any day  and  the actual  return is  defined to  be  the abnormal  return 
that is  presumably  due  to  the rival acquisition announcement.  These  abnormal 
returns are then summed  over  narrow intervals around  the acquisition 
announcement  date  to  produce  cumulative abnormal  return measures  that are the 
focus of the analy~is.~ 
Li  nkage Measures 
Numerous  linkage measures,  similar to those  used  in  previous studies,  were 
constructed.  For  each  acquisition,  the linkage measures  were  calculated using 
data from the Summary  of Deposit report closest  to that acquisition date. 
Both aggregate  linkage measures  and  linkage measures  of  each  rival with each 
acquiring firm were  created.  For  some  measures,  rival rankings were 
considered as  well.  For example,  for  certain measures,  a link was  only 
presumed  to  exist if both the acquiring and  rival firms were  in  the top three 
in  a given geographic  unit, if both were  in the top five or where  either was 
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geographic  bases:  counties,  SMSAs  and,  to  crudely approximate banking markets, 
SMSAs  and  rural counties.  Measures  were  also constructed where  a presence  was 
presumed  to  exist as  the result of  an  announced,  but as  yet uncompleted, 
acquisition.  Since the competitive impacts of  the acquisitions are presumed 
to  be  reflected in investor expectations of changes  in  future profits, and 
since the acquisition announcements  are  clustered to  some  extent,  such  linkage 
measures  might be  more  appropriate.  The  definitions of the linkage measures 
employed  are detailed in tables  1  and  2. 
IV.  Results 
Portfolio CAARS  and  Aggregate  Links 
An  attempt was  made  to replicate Eckbo's  analysis for the sample  of rival 
BHC's.  The  cumulative abnormal  returns for equally weighted portfolios of 
rivals were  averaged cross-sectionally to  crudely investigate  the competitive 
impact of the acquisition announcements.  Collusive merger  impacts  are 
suggested by positive abnormal  rival returns.  Specifically,  averages  were 
calculated separately for mergers  in  which  so-called aggregate  linkages 
measures  changed  and  for events  in  which  they did not change.  The  results of 
this exercise are summarized  in  table 4."  With one  exception,  the results 
appear  to  support the existence of  the mutual  forbearance hypothesis. 
Specifically,  CAARs,  for cases  when  there  is no change  in the aggregate 
linkage measures,  are positive,  but generally not significant.  In  events 
where  the linkage measures  increased,  the CAARs  are considerably larger and 
significantly different from zero.  In  particular,  the results in  the bottom 
part of the table are notable because  the linkage measure  AL2  may  be  a better 
linkage measure  than AL1. 
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The  relationship between  rival CARs  around  acquisition dates and  their 
linkages  with the acquiring institution was  also explored using regression 
analysis.  Specifically,  regressions were  estimated  in  which  the rival CARs 
for a particular acquisition were  presumed  to  depend  on  the change  in  their 
1 inkages with the acquiring institution.  Regressions  were  also estimated with 
an  interaction term (the product of  the change  in links and  the  ?eve1 of links 
prevailing prior to  the announced  acquisition)  included.  This  specification 
allows  the impact of  a change  in links to vary with the  level of links in 
existence at the time  the acquisition is  announced. 
The  strongest indication that large acquisitions are creating conditions 
conducive  to  mutual  forbearance would  be  a positive coefficient  on  the change 
in  link variable and  on  the the interaction term when  it  is included as  well. 
The  strongest evidence against the linked oligopoly hypothesis  would  be 
negative coefficients on both terms.  Differently  signed coefficients on  the 
two terms,  when  both are included in the estimated equation,  suggest  that the 
impact of a given change  in  links differs  depending on a rival's level of 
existing links.  In  particular,  a positive coefficient on  the change  variable, 
and  a negative coefficient  on the interaction term,  suggests  that the size of 
the rival CAR  response  to  a unit change  in links is smaller,  the higher  the 
level of  pre-acquisition links with the acquiring institution.  This(imp1ies  a 
negative CAR  response  to  an  increase  in  links for rivals with pre-acquisition 
links above  some  threshold level.  Such  a finding would  appear  to  contradict 
the mutual  forbearance hypothesis.  It also might  indicate that takeover 
speculation rather than any  linked oligopoly effect is  responsible for the 
positive significant  rival portfolio returns previously reported.  That  is, 
positive CAAR's  for  portfolios  of  rivals may  primarily reflect positive CAR'S 
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with any acquiring competitor, and after a major acquisition is announced, 
investors may view such firms as the most likely future acquisition targets. 
Several different  versions of the basic regression equation were estimated 
with a variety of nonlinkage explanatory variables included.  For example, 
various absolute and relative size variables  (bidder,  rival, target),  a local 
market concentration change dummy and year-of-acquisition dummies were added 
to the basic equation.  Presumably, the latter pick up the effects of actual 
or expected growth in the various states or interstate banking expectations. 
Neither size variable nor the concentration change dummy was even marginally 
significant.  Including these variables did not affect the estimated 
coefficients on the linkage variables, and so do not appear in any of the 
equations reported.  The year dummies appear in reported equations when at 
least one was significant.  Inclusion of the year dummies also did not 
generally alter the estimated coefficients on the linkage variables in  any 
mater  i a1  way. 
The regressions were estimated for each of the six states individually to 
avoid problems encountered in pooling.  The states are heterogeneous, and 
slightly different time periods are represented  in each, so pooling was deemed 
inappropriate.  It also  appeared to be desirable to  examine the nature of  the 
relationship between rival returns and linkages in each of  the six states 
rather than some average effect across states.  However, this approach meant 
that, in several  states, the number of degrees of  freedom available was quite 
low. 
The regression results for Texas are presented in tables 5 and 6.  This 
was the state with the largest number of  acquisitions and observations in the 
sample.  Also the bulk of  the acquisitions in Texas 
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legislation should not affect the results in  any  way.  In  addition,  Texas  is  a 
unit banking  state where  the thrift presence  is  not as  great as  in  other 
states (such  as  Ohio),  so the environment  in such  a state would  seem  to  be 
most  conducive  to linked oligopoly. 
A positive significant relationship between  the change  in link variable 
and  rival CARS  was  found  in Texas.  This result did not appear  to  be  sensitive 
to the  linkage measure  employed.  However,  when  an  interaction term was  added 
to  the regression equation,  its estimated  coefficient was  significant and  the 
explanatory power  of the estimated equations  improved.  Thus,  this is the form 
of the equations  reported and  discussed. 
In  the estimated equations,  the coefficients on  the  linkage change 
variable and  interaction term are positive and  negative,  respectively,  and 
both are  statistically significant.  This finding implies  that acquisitions 
that increase  linkages  are not always  associated  with positive rival returns. 
Rather  an  increase  in  linkages can  be  associated  with a decline in  the returns 
of rivals whose  existing links approach or exceed  a threshold level that 
varies depending on how  linkages are defined.  In  the case of simple  tallies 
for counties  (table 5,  equation  I),  this level  is  approximately  11,  a value 
below  the maximum  number  of rival-acquiring firm links in  Texas. 
Similar,  but  somewhat  stronger,  results are evident for linkage measures 
that take rival and  bidder  size rankings into account  (see  table 5,  equations 
2  and  3).  For  example,  the statistical significance of the linkage change  and 
interaction term coefficients are considerably higher in the equation in  which 
links are presumed  to  exist only if the rival and  acquiring BHCs  are both 
among  the three largest organizations  in the county.  This  improvement  is  not 
unexpected.  Several  researchers have  emphasized  that the relative size of 
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interdependence  and  thus  the intensity of  competition. 
If the linkage measures  are recomputed  to  reflect the impact of  announced, 
but uncompleted acquisitions,  the signs of  the estimated  coefficients again 
are unchanged  and  become  even  stronger  statistically (see  table 6).  And 
again,  the linkage measures  that take account  of relative size yield somewhat 
stronger  results. 
Thus,  the results for Texas  suggest  that BHC  acquisitions are not creating 
conditions  conducive  to linked oligopoly. 
In Wisconsin,  similar results were  obtained despite a much  smaller  number 
of  observations  (see  table 7).  Both  the change  and  interaction term are 
typically significant in the estimated equations with the same  pattern of 
coefficient signs  seen  for Texas. 
The  results in  the other  states were  more  varied.  In  Michigan,  again a 
state with a  limited number  of  observations,  results similar to  those reported 
above  were  obtained (see  table 8).  The  same  pattern of signs  was  observed: 
positive on  the change  and  negative on  the interaction term.  However,  these 
results were  only significant in  equations  where  the rival CAR  measure, 
defined over  the -3  to  +3 interval,  was  used  as  the dependent  variable.  The 
year  dummies  were  never  significant in  Michigan and  so do not appear  in  the 
regressions  reported. 
In  Ohio,  although the  signs of  the estimated coefficients on  the  linkage 
change  and  interaction variables were  in line with those reported above, 
neither was  generally significant.  However,  there was  one  exception.  When 
links were  defined  using SMSAs  and  rural counties as  the units of analysis, 
both of the coefficients were  significant and  the signs  were  unchanged  (see 
table 9,  equation 1).  One  reasonable explanation for the increase  in 
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that,  since 1979,  Ohio banks  have  enjoyed more  liberal branching privileges 
than  those  in  the other  states (with the exception of  New  Jersey)  in  the 
sample.  When  a large banking organization is  present  in  a given SMSA  in  Ohio, 
it can  and  typically has  branched  widely throughout all the counties  that 
comprise it.  Thus,  the competitive position of  a BHC  in  Ohio is probably 
better represented by  SMSA-rural  county  linkage measures  than by  county 
measures. 
The  results in  Missouri  generally differed from those  in the states 
previously discussed.  In  Missouri,  only the  linkage change  variable was 
significant and  only in  equations  where  the rival CAR's  defined over  the -3,+3 
interval  are used  as  the dependent  variable (see  table 9,  equation  2).  The 
estimated coefficient is  positive.  The  interaction term is  never  significant, 
although it  typically exhibits a negative  sign.  Thus,  the evidence  in 
Missouri  is  not inconsistent with the existence of linked oligopoly. 
Finally,  in  New  Jersey,  neither the change  nor  the interaction term was 
found  to  be  significantly related to  rival returns,  no matter how  linkages 
were  measured  (see  table 9,  equation 3).  Once  again,  the pattern of the 
coefficient signs  was  the same.  There  are  several  possible explanations  for 
the absence  of  a significant relationship between  rival CAR's  and  linkages  in 
New  Jersey.  Given  its proximity to  New  York  and  Philadelphia,  New  Jersey 
banks  undoubtedly are  influenced by  the large banks  in  both of  these areas. 
Thus,  structural conditions in  New  Jersey per  se  may  not be  important 
determinants of  the behavior of  New  Jersey banks.  In  addition,  New  Jersey 
contains only 21  counties  and  statewide  branching has  been  permitted for some 
time.  As  a result, most of the rivals faced each  other  in  a large proportion 
of  the counties  throughout  the state at the outset of the period examined. 
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might view the entire state as  one  market and  linkages might not affect their 
behavior.  Given both of these  circumstances,  the absence  of a strong 
relationship between  linkage changes  and  rival returns in  New  Jersey over  the 
period of  observation  is  not surprising. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The  empirical  findings at first  glance appear  to  be  mixed.  Analysis of 
the cumulative average  abnormal  returns for  portfolios of  rivals suggests  that 
BHC  acquisitions that cause  linkages among  the three dominant  firms to 
increase may  cause  competition to diminish through  a linked oligopoly effect. 
However,  these results could also reflect  the impact of takeover  speculation 
on  the stock returns of smaller  rivals.  Given  the additional  set of  empirical 
results generated  using the regression approach,  the latter interpretation of 
these findings  appears  to  be  more  likely. 
When  the relationship between  individual rival cumulative abnormal  returns 
and  changes  in  linkages  with the acquiring BHC  is  examined,  the findings do 
not seem  to  be  consistent with the linked oligopoly hypothesis.  The  results 
indicate that an  increase  in  links is  associated with higher abnormal  returns, 
but the positive impact of  an  increase in  links declines,  the higher the 
rival's level of  preacquisition links with the acquiring institution.  In 
fact, the magnitude  of  the estimated coefficients  implies that a linkage 
increase  is associated with negative abnormal  returns for certain companies  in 
the sample.  Such  a finding seems  to  be  in  line with the results reported by 
others investigating the linked oligopoly hypothesis  using different 
approaches,  i.e.  large numbers  of links tend to  stimulate rather than mute 
competition. 
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increases  in  multimarket  linkages among  BHC's  do not lead to  mutual 
forbearance.  This,  in  turn,  implies that the increase in  aggregate 
concentration expected  in the interstate banking era is  unlikely to  have 
materially adverse  impacts  on competition. 
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1.  The  notion of an  anti-competitive,  linked-oligopoly effect was  first 
articulated by Corwin Edwards  (1955).  It  was  one  of several  possible 
consequences  of  conglomerate bigness discussed in  his 1955  paper,  and  was 
advanced  without rigorous theoretical or empirical  support. 
2.  A recent review of the literature can  be  found  in  Alexander  (19851,  pp. 
123-125. 
3.  Available evidence  suggests  that this is  the case.  See  Whalen  (1981). 
4.  For  a detailed discussion of  this approach,  see  Eckbo  (1983)  and  Eckbo 
(1985). 
5.  As  Eckbo  (1983)  pointed out,  however,  positive abnormal  returns accruing to 
rival firms do not provide a sufficient condition for an  anti-competitive 
effect.  Rival  BHCs  could earn positive abnormal  returns around  competitive 
mergers  if  the acquisition announcement  provides  new  information about markets 
or generates  speculation about potential  acquisitions. 
6.  This method  of  calculating abnormal  returns was  used  for a variety of 
reasons.  Brown  and  Warner  (1985)  have  shown  that this approach  is  generally 
superior  to  others.  No  explicit attempt was  made  to  adjust for the problem of 
nonsynchronous  trading.  In  event studies where  this has  been  done,  the 
empirical results are generally unchanged. 
7.  A  number  of researchers  have  argued  that the two-factor specification  is 
appropriate when  banks  are analyzed  using the event-study  technique.  See 
Eisenbeis  et al.  (1984),  for example. 
8.  There  are two reasons  why  narrow  intervals were  examined.  In  efficient 
markets,  stock prices should rapidly reflect investor  expectations of the 
impact of any  new  information.  Second,  in some  cases  in the sample, 
consecutive  acquisition announcements  in  a given state were  separated by  as 
few as  seven  days. 
9.  The  test statistics are z  values,  developed  using the approach  detailed in 
Eckbo  (19831,  footnote 12,  pp.  251-252. 
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Definition of  Link Measures: 
Links  wi  th Acquiring BHCs 
Lli =  number  of  markets  in  which  rival and  acquirer meet. 
L4i  =  change  in  Lli that would  result from the proposed merger. 
L6i  =  number  of  markets  in  which  rival and  acquirer meet,  counting  1 inks 
only when  both are  in the top three. 
L8i =  change  in  L6i  that would  result from the proposed merger. 
L9i =  number  of markets  in which  rival and  acquirer meet,  counting links 
only when  both are  in the top five. 
Llli =  change  in L9i  that would result from the proposed merger. 
L12i =  number  of  markets  in  which  rival and  acquirer meet,  counting links 
only when  either BHC  is in  the top 5. 
L14i =  change  in L12i  that would  result from the proposed merger. 
For  each  link concept above,  interaction terms  are  symbolically 
represented as  the product of the corresponding  change  and  level 
variables:  LliL4i,  L6iL8i,  L9iLlli or L12iL14i. 
Note:  i =  1  indicates links calculated by SMSA. 
i =  2 indicates links calculated by SMSA 
and  rural counties. 
i =  3  indicates links calculated by  county. 
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Aggregate  Link Measures 
AL1  =  Number  of  markets  in which  BHC-rank  1  meets  BHC-rank  2, 
BHC-rank  1  meets  BHC-rank  3,  and  BHC-rank  2  meets  BHC-rank  3. 
AL2  =  Number  of  markets  in which  BHC-rank  1,  BHC-rank  2  and  BHC-rank 
3  a1 1  meet. 
Note :  Suffix "SMSA"  indicates  links calculated by  SMSA. 
Suffix "CNTY"  indicates  links calculated by  county 
TABLE  3 
Definition of  Other  Variables 
PCAARij  =  cumulative average  abnormal  return for portfolio of  rivals in 
percent,  calculated over  the  interval beginning i days  before 
and  ending j  days  after the merger  announcement  date 
CARij  =  cumulative abnormal  rival return for individual  rivals in 
percent,  calculated over  the interval beginning i days  before 
and  ending j  days  after the merger  announcement  date. 
YRDij  =  1  if  the merger  announcement  occurred in  the year  19ij, 
otherwise equal  to  zero. 
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Aggregate  Link Measures 
and  Portfolio Returns 
A.  Link Measure  =  AL1 
No  Change  in  Links: 
SMS A  County 
Increase  in  Links: 
SMSA  County 
Return Measure  -  N=44  N=35  N=l 1  N=20 
PCAARl 1  +0.33  +0.54  +0.97  +0.32 
(1  .04>  (2.02)  (3.25)  (1.28) 
6.  Link Measure  =  AL2 
Return Measure 
No  Change  in  Links: 
SMSA  County 
Increase  in  Links: 
SMSA  County 
PCAARl 1  +0.34  +0.41  +1.44  +0.70 
(1.27)  (1.62)  (3.59)  (2.16) 
Note:  z  values  in  parentheses. 
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Regression Results:  Texas 
Dependent  Var:  CAR11 
EQUATION  1: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  T  VALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .012659 
L43  .018552 
L13L43  -.001564 
Y  RD80  .000171 
Y  RD8 1  -.016105 
Y  RD82  -.011015 
YRD83  -.013581 
YRD85  - .012924 
EQUATION  2: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .012854 
L83  .026531 
L63L83  -  .004842 
Y RD80  - .00002  4 
Y  RD8 1  - .018602 
Y  RD82  -.007572 
Y RD83  -.  009263 
Y RD85  -.010414 
EQUATION  3: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .011531 
L113  .017423 
L93L113  -.001788 
Y  RD80  .001299 
Y  RD8 1  -.016187 
YRD82  -.007715 
YRD83  -.010109 
Y  RD85  -.011145 
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Regression  Results:  Texas" 
Dependent  Var:  CAR11 
EQUATION  1: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DO  F  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .011737 
LA43  .020576 
LA1 343  -.001940 
Y RD80  .001093 
Y RD8 1  -.016061 
Y  RD82  -.007711 
YRD83  -.  01  2064 
YRD85  -.011165 
EQUATION  2: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .009606 
LA83  .030584 
LA6383  -.  005335 
Y RD80  .003224 
Y RD8 1  -.014217 
Y  RD82  -  .002902 
YRD83  -.  006688 
YRD85  -.007173 
EQUATION  3: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  T  VALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .010355 
LA1 13  .019347 
LA931 13  -.002024 
Y  RD80  .002474 
Y RD8 1  -.014185 
YRD82  -.  005057 
YRD83  -.  009265 
Y RD8 5  -.010165 
*The  'A'  in  the linkage measures  in  this table indicate 
that these measures  take announced,  but uncompleted, 
acquisitions into account. 
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Regression Results:  Wisconsin 
Dependent  Var:  CAR11 
EQUATION  1 : 
VARIABLE  COEF F 
CONSTANT  .019159 
L43  .064224 
L13L43  -  .009845 
Y RD85  -.  022047 
EQUATION  2: 
VARIABLE  COEFF 
CONSTANT  .017686 
L113  .026399 
L93L113  -.  008955 
YRD85  -.  01  6903 
EQUATION  3: 
VARIABLE  COEFF 
CONSTANT  -01  9385 
L143  -052779 
L123L143  -.009270 
Y RD85  -.  023658 
T VALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
T VALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
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Regression Results:  Michigan 
Dependent  Var:  CAR33 
EQUATION  1: 
VARIAGLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  - .011535  -0.94  2.71  2,26  .ll 
L43  .01181  1  2.33 
L13L43  - .00090  1  -2.01 
EQUATION  2: 
VARIABLE  COE F  F  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  - .006412  -0.52  2.56  2,26  .10 
L1  13  .011811  2.08 
L93L113  -.  002458  -2.03 
EQUATION  3: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  -.010813  -0.87  3.55  2,26  .15 
L143  .011197  2.65 
L123L143  - .000964  -2.26 
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Regression Results:  Ohio 
Dependent  Var:  CARll 
EQUATION  1: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  -.  01  5767  -1.66  2.79  6,46  .17 
L42  .  0  1  4459  1.94 
L12L42  -.002616  -2.20 
Y  RD8 1  .019302  1.76 
Y RD82  .010550  0.79 
YRD83  .034095  2.54 
Y RD84  .047560  3.36 
Regression Results:  Missouri 
Dependent  Var:  CAR33 
EQUATION  2: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  T  VALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .008590  1  .Ol  2.29  3,30  .ll 
L43  .012561  1.80 
YRD84  - .060809  -2.62 
YRD85  -  -004067  -0.32 
Regression Results:  New  Jersey 
Dependent  Var:  CARll 
EQUATION  3: 
VARIABLE  COEFF  TVALUE  F  DOF  RBAR 
CONSTANT  .000830  0.13  2.14  4,43  .09 
L43  .005205  0.46 
L13L43  -.000210  -0.25 
Y RD84  .008898  0.50 
YRD85  -.015145  -1.57 
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